Applied Set-Valued Analysis and Optimization

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DOI: 10.23952/asvao.7.2025.2.02
Volume 7, Issue 2, 1 August 2025, Pages 165-177

 

Abstract. The generalized Nash equilibrium problem play a significant role in modeling and analyzing several complex economics problems. In this paper, we consider jointly convex generalized Nash games which were introduced by Rosen. We study two important aspects related to these games, which include the weak sharpness property for the set of normalized Nash equilibria and the linear conditioning technique for regularized Nikaido-Isoda function. First, we define the weak sharpness property for the set of normalized Nash equilibria, and then we provide its characterization in terms of the regularized gap function. Furthermore, we provide the sufficient conditions under which the linear conditioning criteria for regularized Nikaido-Isoda function becomes equivalent to the weak sharpness property for the set of normalized Nash equilibria. We demonstrate that an iterative algorithm used for determining a normalized Nash equilibrium for jointly convex generalized Nash games terminates finitely under the weak sharpness and linear conditioning assumptions. Finally, we estimate the number of steps needed to determine a solution for the specific type of jointly convex generalized Nash game as an application.

 

How to Cite this Article:
A. Sultana, S. Valecha, Finite convergence criteria for normalized Nash equilibrium through weak sharpness and linear conditioning, Appl. Set-Valued Anal. Optim. 7 (2025), 165-177.